The Smoke You Don't See: Uncovering Tobacco Industry Scientific Strategies Aimed Against Environmental
Tobacco Smoke Policies
Monique E. Muggli,
MPH, Jean L. Forster, PhD, MPH, Richard D. Hurt, MD and James L. Repace, MSc(1)
Authors reviewed 618 boxes of internal tobacco industry documents to learn the details of the industry’s scientific
efforts of undermining policies addressing environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) or secondhand smoke. The documents revealed an
expansive campaign by the tobacco industry to produce scientific research and influence public opinion on health consequences
associated with ETS. The industry feared the ETS issue and any regulation on smoking in public places because of the effects
such regulation would have on industry profits owing to 1) decreases in consumption, 2) increases in litigation, and 3) weakened
support for business owners and politicians.
The full paper on what
the authors found in the internal industry documents can be found here.
The
whole truth and nothing but the truth? The research that Philip Morris did not want you to see
Pascal A Diethelm, Jean-Charles Rielle, Martin McKee (2)
Abstract: The tobacco industry maintained, for many years, that it was unaware
of research about the toxic effects of smoking. By the 1970s, however, the industry decided that it needed this information
but they were unwilling to seek it in a way that was open to public scrutiny. By means of material from internal industry
documents, it can be revealed that one company, Philip Morris, acquired a research facility, INBIFO, in Germany and created
a complex mechanism seeking to ensure that the work done in the facility could not be linked to Philip Morris. In particular,
it involved the appointment of a Swedish professor as a 'coordinator', who would synthesize reports for onward transmission
to the USA. Various arrangements were made to conceal this process, not only from the wider public, but also from many within
Philip Morris, although some senior executives knew it. INBIFO appears to have published only a small amount of its research,
and what was published appears to differ considerably from what was not. In particular, the unpublished reports provided evidence
of the greater toxicity of side stream than mainstream smoke, a finding of particular relevance given the industry's continuing
denial of the harmful effects of passive smoking. By contrast, much of its published work conveys a message that could be
considered useful to the industry, in particular casting doubt on methods used to assess the effects of passive smoking.
The following paper summarizes these findings: http://image.thelancet.com/extras/03art7306web.pdf
Ragnar Rylander, the Swedish professor funded by Philip Morris, was working at the University of Geneva
at the time of his research for the tobacco industry. His studies on the effects of environmental tobacco smoke on health
were marred with serious suspicion, because of his conflict of interest due to his ties to the tobacco industry. After litigation
which Rylander lost against two tobacco control advocates (for defamation), the University proposed that it should be forbidden
for members of the University to solicit funding for their research activities or to seek consultancies, either directly or
indirectly, from the tobacco industry.
Chasing the dollar:
why scientists should decline tobacco industry funding
R
E Malone, L A Bero (3)
The authors of this editorial argue that credibility
is perhaps the most desired scientific product of tobacco industry funded research. Credibility is essential to the positive
public image the tobacco industry uses to increase product consumption, influence public opinion, and solicit opposition to
effective public health policies.
The researchers who authored this
editorial reviewed internal tobacco industry documents to learn of the industry's funding behavior. These documents reveal
shifting in funding of research on secondhand smoke to funding research on other indoor air contaminants. The change in funding
occurred when the tobacco industry found that the research on secondhand smoke did not support its position. While industry
funded research was found to be of the same rigour as non-industry funded research, the results tend to favor the industry
and unfavorable results are suppressed.
A copy of the full editorial
can be downloaded here.
Changing
Conclusions on Secondhand Smoke in a Sudden Infant Death Syndrome Review Funded by the Tobacco Industry
Elisa K. Tong, MD, Lucinda England, MD and Stanton A. Glantz, PhD (4)
Results: PM executives feared that SHS and maternal and
child health issues would create a powerful and emotional impetus for smoke-free areas in the home, public areas, and the
workplace. In response to the 1992 US EPA report on SHS, the Science and Technology Department of PM’s Switzerland subsidiary,
Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, searched for "independent" consultants to publish articles addressing SHS. The first
industry-funded article was a literature review focusing on smoking and SIDS, conducted by consultant Peter Lee and co-author
Allison Thornton, which stated that the association between parental smoking and SIDS could have been attributable to the
failure to control fully for confounders. That first review has only been cited once, in the subsequent industry-funded review.
In 1997, PM commissioned a consultant, Frank Sullivan, to
write a review, with coauthor Susan Barlow, of all possible risk factors for SIDS. The first draft concluded that prenatal
and postnatal smoking exposures are both independent risk factors for SIDS. After receiving comments and meeting with PM scientific
executives, Sullivan changed his original conclusions on smoking and SIDS. The final draft was changed to emphasize the effects
of prenatal maternal smoking and to conclude that postnatal SHS effects were "less well established." Changes in
the draft to support this new conclusion included descriptions of Peter Lee’s industry-funded review, a 1999 negative
but underpowered study of SIDS risk and urinary cotinine levels, and criticisms of the conclusions of the National Cancer
Institute report that SHS was causally associated with SIDS. In April 2001, the Sullivan review was published in the United
Kingdom journal Paediatric and Perinatal Epidemiology, with a disclosure statement that acknowledged financial support from
PM but did not acknowledge contributions from PM executives in the preparation of the review. By 2004, the Sullivan SIDS review
had been cited at least 19 times in the medical literature.
A copy
of the study can be downloaded here.
